This Article will demonstrate that the hybrid mode of voting -non-debated yet non-secret voting such as in contemporary absentee balloting, in union organizing petitions (so called "card check" campaigns) as well as among corporate shareholderscarries with it the weaknesses of each system without the strengths. Accordingly, where possible the situations that use this hybrid should be reformed to adopt the open or secret modes.

For absentee voting in elections, jurisdictions should provide early voting in controlled locations where the protection against coercion and fraud are possible. In the labor organizing context, the choice of a bare majority through card check must not determine whether the workplace is organized. Instead, it should provide the first step to an organizing election (as a petition places an issue on the ballot). Legitimate grievances about the fairness of union organizing elections, and whether employers are engaging in unfair labor practices, offer no justification for discarding the protection from fraud and coercion secured through a secret ballot. Voting by shareholders can also be nondebated and non-secret, but the diverse characteristics of large and small shareholders counsel for transparency when large institutional investors are engaged in contested corporate voting.
Americans have many opportunities to vote. A mere three million Arkansans may have cast 38 million votes in May 2009 for American Idol favorite Kris Allen. In the process of adopting new terms of service, the social networking site Facebook took a * Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. I am grateful for helpful thoughts from Profs. Ross Davies, Todd Zywicki, Harry Hutchison, David Schleicher, Deborah Markowitz and Dr. Jason Karlawish.
vote of its users on the proposed terms.
1 Each of the 6,000 members of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences can vote on the recipients of Oscars, tabulated by the firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
2 American Idol lets viewers cast as many votes as they want -Facebook and the Academy follow a one-vote-per-voter rule. None of the systems described above publicize how specific voters voted, but other voting systems reveal, on purpose, how their members vote. Athenians voted by a show of hands, Romans, before the introduction of the ballot, voted individually by voice.
3 So did voters in many American jurisdictions in the 19 th Century. Members of Congress vote publicly, and how they vote is recorded for posterity. 4 The way a group, jurisdiction, or nation votes, and makes decisions binding on their members and citizens, is fundamental and deceptively prosaic. Why do some groups (faculties, Congress, caucuses, HOAs) take public votes in most contexts, accompanied by debate, sometimes heated? Why do others (electorates, labor unions) take private votes (often by ballot cast in a secure setting where "heated debate" is not allowed) in most contexts? Moreover, what should we make of the exceptions to these general forms?
As we shall see, both debate-plus-open-voting and nondebate-plus-secret-voting have their strengths and weaknesses. Open voting makes sense when voters are also representatives, so that their constituencies can observe their choices and hold them accountable. It also makes sense when the question before the body encompasses a spectrum of choices, since this method accommodates amendment, as well as compromise. If the issue is complex or arcane, discussion before the vote permits some voter education. Choices can be made quickly, or delayed if more time is needed. Under most procedural systems, a voter in the prevailing side may seek reconsideration of a question, so this form of voting accommodates second thoughts or "voters remorse." Secret voting sans debate makes more sense when we want the voter to select his own preference, which may otherwise distorted by coercion, peer pressure, or fraud. Such overweening influence could undercut the legitimacy of the result by distorting the electorate's opinion. This voting technique works best when there is a limited spectrum of choices -"yes" or "no" on a ballot issue, or a choice among a limited roster of candidates. It is also best preceded by a campaign, so that voters come to the vote having already thought about the alternatives. Lead time is necessary. It also requires advance planning and investment in the means for casting votes, namely voting locations, ballots, monitors, and tabulators. This Article will demonstrate that the hybrid mode of voting -non-debated yet non-secret voting such as in contemporary absentee balloting, in union organizing petitions (so called "card check" campaigns) as well as among corporate shareholderscarries with it the weaknesses of each system without the strengths. Accordingly, where possible the situations that use this hybrid should be reformed to adopt the open or secret modes. For absentee voting in elections, jurisdictions should provide early voting in controlled locations where the protection against coercion and fraud are possible. In the labor organizing context, the choice of a bare majority through card check must not determine whether the workplace is organized. Instead, it should provide the first step to an organizing election (as a petition places an issue on the ballot). Legitimate grievances about the fairness of union organizing elections, and whether employers are engaging in unfair labor practices, offer no justification for discarding the protection from fraud and coercion secured through a secret ballot. Voting by shareholders can also be nondebated and nonsecret, but the diverse characteristics of large and small shareholders counsel for transparency when large institutional investors are engaged in contested corporate voting.
Section I offers an overview of how different institutions provide for voting, and draws from those examples some principles for choosing a voting method. Section II reviews the history of voting procedures in Britain and in the United States that further illustrates these principles in practice. Section III looks at situations where those principles are not followed, namely in absentee balloting, car check recognition campaigns, and corporate shareholder voting, and evaluates whether these are legitimate exceptions, and what modifications might be appropriate. Section IV concludes this Article.
I.
How We Vote
A. Overview
The manner in which groups hold votes may be merely traditional, but tradition can often reflect an appreciation for what procedures render good results. Through voting, groups make decisions; but unlike consulting a shaman, flipping a coin, or tossing darts at a board, voting should aggregate what a group's members know and what their understanding is of the best choice.
5
Voting systems must manage two separate characteristics. The first is the character of the decision being made. Is the question before the voter vague, open-ended, transitory or complex? Is focused discussion necessary to educate the voter's judgment, or can the election take the voter as he comes, after (potentially) a campaign about the merits? Certain decisions are better made in deliberative assemblies rather than by balloting. Debate can bring the question into focus, and can allow a body to make a 5 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA 201 (2006) ("Groups should take firm steps to increase the likelihood that people will disclose what they know"). prompt decision. An aspect of deliberation is also the flexibility to modify the issue before the vote. Motions can be amended; ballots can't.
Another element to consider is whether the voters will be asked to choose among a large number of alternatives, or whether the vote is yes/no or choice between two viable contenders. 6 The more alternatives, the more votes may need to be taken. It is simple for a meeting to accommodate a series of votes on amendments that would require separate elections by ballot, and avoid the problem of "cycling preferences" where the electorate end up with a suboptimal choice. 7 The second characteristic is voter independence, power, or vulnerability. In the context where the vote is cast, is it important at that moment for the voter to be insulated from pressure, so as to express his preference privately, sincerely, anonymously and secretly? Is the vote to be taken among a relatively large body of voters who are not themselves necessarily powerful or influential? Is there danger that the voter will face recriminations after the election for his vote, or is the voter himself powerful and resilient? Is it possible for publicity to permit a briber to confirm that a voter remained bought, but preserve in secret the corrupt deal? Is the voter instead a representative of a larger group, who should be accountable publicly to them?
The characterization of the question before the voter, and the voter's vulnerability, are not alternatives, but are independent characteristics. Taken as such, one can sort contemporary uses of voting modes into categories. This exercise helps identify the typical as well as atypical applications for open or secret voting. 
B.
Why Vote in Secret?
Secret ballot voting should be seen as an important exception, useful in those situations where voters are voting as individuals on a settled issue or roster of issues. Secret balloting requires some planning and infrastructure. We should explore what purpose voting in secret serves that justified its adoption, with that expense, in these situations.
When should voters get to vote in secret? Part of the answer may be what a vote in this kind of situation is meant to accomplish. Secret voting is important in situations where we want voters to register their preference secure in the knowledge that no one will know how they voted. Historically, secret balloting has been instituted in response to fraud, but it can stand on its own in situations where elections need to register the sentiment of a relatively large group about a contested issue of general interest. Condorcet's widely discussed insights suggested that individual voters are more likely to be correct about the choice that is best for them, and for the polity overall. Sincere expression of majority will is likely to choose the best alternative. provides legitimacy to a system by which agents act for the larger group. It serves both to legitimize the agent's choice and to monitor the work of the agent." The "best" is a desirable outcome, not only because it may better serve the welfare of the group, but because dissenters, understanding this, will more willingly acquiesce to the majority's choice (at least in the short run). We especially care about dissenters feelings of legitimacy when the "group" under discussion is a political subdivision.
10 "Love it or Leave it" (or "exit" in Albert Hirschmann's influential description) is rarely a realistic choice in a polity. Moreover, withdrawal is undesirable if those dissenters' honest perspectives as voters will be necessary for future good decisions on other questions.
11
Also, when dissenters feel cheated, their attempt to rectify the direction of government can take antisocial forms.
12 At the very least, they will feel less a part of the process of self-government.
13
A vote influenced by bribery, extortion, or other forms of coercion may not reflect the voter's knowledge or honest opinion, will not as reliably lead to the best result, and will not earn the respect of dissenters. It follows that if an election is to serve the welfare of a large group, deserve respect, and keep the peace and order, voting procedures in such contexts should insulate voters from outside influence at the time of voting.
If that is the case, then would this model also counsel against campaigning? One might infer that if undue influence at the time of the vote skews the result, than prior exhortations about the vote are similarly suspect. A candidate may not bribe a voter but instead make a campaign promise that profits the voter. But campaign speech also provides the chance for information sharing, assessments of comparative advantage and disadvantage, deliberation and second-guessing -all potentially occasions for improving the quality of any one voter's vote.
14 That voter also retains the discretion whether to vote -secretly -for the candidate (and the promise) or not.
Thus, a well-run election in a body where exit is unrealistic, like a political jurisdiction, should restrict as much as possible any opportunities for threats, bribes, or monitoring at the moment of voting. Other voting contexts however, present competing concerns and should be administered differently. Thus, when the voter is also a th Century over the "ballot" consider the practical consequences of the concerns raised above.
While contested parliamentary elections were uncommon in the 18 th century, those that were contested were intense. Couple the intensity of interest with compulsory open voting (sometimes followed by the publication of the poll book) the voting system facilitated buying votes, or retaliating against voters. 17 The Chartist movement demanded, among other things, "the ballot" in the People's Charter published in 1838.
18
Other aspects of the reform agenda came first, among them the reallocation of representation and broadening the franchise. After a 40 year campaign, Britain adopted the secret ballot in 1872.
19
That advocates of the secret ballot faced such opposition seems remarkable today. Yet as recently as the 1860s in Britain, there was little popular support for secret ballots. 20 People, and their politicians, criticized the ballot as a way to cloak voters preferences and reduce accountability. The ballot was "un-English" and "un-manly." Attitudes changed with the broadening of the British franchise in 1868. "Men in humble circumstances" could vote, and scandalous corrupt efforts to secure those new votes provided the rationale for a renewed campaign for the secret ballot.
23 Parliament finally adopted a secret ballot in 1872. 24 Better to settle for the "un-manly" secret ballot than permit bribery and coercion of voters.
The secret ballot debate in Britain was about more than political expediency. Many of the leading political thinkers of the period at one point or another offered theoretical justifications for (and against) the secret ballot. Jeremy Bentham, in his Essay on Political Tactics, set forth his vision of proper voting. 25 In public assemblies, Bentham observed, their procedures should provide publicity for debates and recorded voting. 26 In this context, representatives will be constrained to do their duty, the public will have greater confidence in their decisions, the public's wishes can be known to representatives, and a constituency can know their representative's record. 27 Bentham rejected concerns arguments that public debate and voting in representative assemblies would lead to public pressure for unwise policies, or expose members to "hatred" or permit representatives to seduce their constituencies in favor of "dangerous propositions." 28 Bentham was confident that publicity in a representative democracy, by giving voice to all perspectives in a debate, would educate the public and more likely permit representatives to choose policies in the interest of society than a system conducted in secret. 29 Yet Bentham recognized that sometimes legislative business should not be publicized. If publicity would aid the enemy, injure unnecessarily innocent persons, or inflict excessive punishment on the guilty, assemblies could exclude such business from publication. Bentham intended these to be narrow exceptions. "Secresy is an instrument of conspiracy; it ought not, therefore, to be the system of a regular government." Id. at 311-15. At the time (1838), Parliament's rules prohibited outsiders from observing its proceedings, or for anyone to report on parliamentary business. However, these rules were routinely violated, to the point that the House of Commons set aside a gallery to accommodate "shorthand writers" from the newspapers. Id. at 316. Under the French Constitution of 1814, all deliberations of the Chamber of Peers were made secret. Id. at 317. 27 Id. at 311-15. 28 Id.
29
Id. at 311-15. 30 Id. at 315.
Although Bentham concluded that publicizing the votes of representatives was necessary and proper, he also saw the need for an exception "in all cases in which there is more to fear from the influence of particular wills, than to hope from the influence of public opinion." 31 In particular, Bentham observed that secrecy is suitable in mass elections, because it impedes vote buying, since the buyer cannot observe whether the voter followed through on the contract. 32 Secrecy should only protect that actual votefor Bentham the debate and campaign before taking the vote is essential for legitimacy and public education.
33 "With this mixture of publicity, secret voting appears to me then, most suitable for elections; that is to say, the most suited to prevent venality and to secure the independence of the electors. In political matters, I do not see any other case in which it can be recommended as a general rule." 34 Similarly, reformer George Grote noted that as the electorate increases in size, it is less useful to think of their votes as "responsible" to society, and more proper to think of their votes as their individual honest opinion.
35
Bentham counseled that the secret vote must be truly secret (or publicity truly public), or an even more debilitating system could arise. "The most detrimental arrangement would be that of demi-publicity" because "individuals would thus be exposed, in all their votes, to every seductive influence, and would be withdrawn from the principal tutelary influences. This is the system which it would be proper to establish, if we would secure punishment to probity, and reward to prevarication." 36 The advocates of the British secret ballot did not prevail at first but they did not rest, as we know. It would be wrong to dismiss their opponents ' to the voter -that his vote was his to use for his benefit, not something exercised in trust for the public good. Mill rejected the notion that one's vote was a "right" and that "this one idea, taking root in the general mind, does a moral mischief outweighing all the good that the ballot could do, at the highest possible estimate of it." 38 A number of pernicious consequences flowed from the notion that a vote is a "right" according to Mill. If the vote belongs as a matter of right to the voter, why should he not be allowed to sell it? 39 Why should he cast it based on his opinion of the public good, rather than his own pleasure or caprice? 40 Mill instead held that in an election, the voter "is under an absolute moral obligation to consider the interests of the public" and thus voting should be performed "under the eye and criticism of the public." 41 Yet even Mill admitted that in situations where a large number of voters are compelled to vote the bidding of a powerful individual, then the secret ballot might be justified. "When the voters are slaves, any thing may be tolerated which enables them to throw off the yoke."
42 But Mill contended that such influence on British voters was declining. While thirty years previous the problem was coercion, now the "much greater source of evil is the selfishness . . . of the voter himself." 43 Mill cited as evidence the growth of bribery, for to him this demonstrated that the voters "now vote to please themselves" rather than landlords or aristocrats. 44 Or as a pamphleteer proclaimed: "He who votes by ballot votes as an individual, he who votes before the world, votes as a component part of a public body." 45 Worst of all, in Mill's view, would be a system providing voters ballots to vote in their own homes. Mill believed the voter must vote in a public poll or another office open to the public and under the eye of a responsible official. "The proposal which has been thrown out of allowing the voting papers to be filled up at the voter's own residence, and sent by the post . . . I should regard as fatal." To Mill, this manner of voting displayed none of either system's salutary benefits, while providing for unchecked corruption. "The briber might, in the shelter of privacy, behold with his own eyes his bargain fulfilled, and the intimidator could see the extorted obedience rendered irrevocably on the spot; while the beneficent counterinfluence of the presence of those 38 MILL, supra note 37 at 206. In the United States, the debate over the state-published secret ballot, called the "Australian ballot" resembled in many characteristics the British ballot debate, with a distinctively American emphasis on the sovereignty of the people. In the 1890 Kentucky Constitutional convention, delegates debated whether to impose the Australian ballot in a state that had used voice voting. Advocates of the reform made Bentham's argument that votes in a representative assembly should be public, but election by the people should be by secret official ballot. 47 Because when the people vote they decide in their sovereign capacity, "they are responsible to nobody but themselves and their God." When agents of the people vote in assemblies, however, they should be accountable to their electors, and thus their votes should be public.
48
In America, the issue in most states was not the "ballot" per se, but confidentiality, or what John Wigmore called "compulsory secrecy" at the polling place. 49 Most American jurisdictions voted by ballot but American ballots were not "secret" ballots. 50 Voters brought their own ballots to a central polling place. While this might theoretically provide an almost limitless range of choice, in practice ballots were prepared not by voters but by parties (or factions). Parties would print out the slate of candidates for all offices, and voters would choose a ticket, then deposit it at the polls. 51 Generally, voters would make their way through a crowd to their voting window with their ticket, hand it 46 MILL, supra note 37 at 220. Mill was unpersuaded by arguments that convenient voting will improve turnout. To Mill, the apathetic voter who cannot be bothered to go to the polling place is also the most likely voter to give his vote "on the most trifling or frivolous inducement." Id. inside to an election official, who would then deposit it in a ballot box out of reach of the public.
52
While the American private ballot system was more closed than that afforded in open voice voting, voters could (and did) exercise more discretion over their vote than might at first appear. Voters could alter their party ballots, by writing on a preferred choice or pasting in the name of another candidate provided by that campaign. 53 Thus, simply because a voter took and cast a Republican ballot did not prove the voter had voted for every candidate on the Republican slate. Furthermore, simply because a party had nominated a specific individual did not prevent members from bolting and voting for another, or for the rival party's nominee -or from tearing off the names of disfavored candidates and voting the rest. 54 But the private ballot system, as a form of "demi-publicity" criticized by Mill and Bentham, also allowed malefactors to distribute misleading or fraudulent ballots. Local parties could print up their own slates to oppose the regular party nominees (or demand money to distribute the "correct" ballot). 55 Opposing parties could circulate "bogus" rival ballots. 56 Amid the tricks, the party-ballot system could accommodate a variety of voters' preferences, but did not secure the privacy of that vote.
"Australian" secret ballot reformers seized both on the vote bribery facilitated by non-secret voting, and the use of irregular ballots to "trade" votes between candidates (even of different parties) as reasons why purity in elections required a secret ballot, printed by the state, and distributed under the control of authorities in a polling place.
57
Between 1888 and 1900 Australian ballot reform swept the United States.
58 Some party leaders, for their part, also saw the Australian ballot as a way to save money, impede access to the ballot by maverick candidates, and thwart disloyal local ballot distributors. Id. at 846. 57 Id. at 849, Wigmore, supra note 21 at 50-57. Standardization was not without costs. "What had been a relatively fluid and informal electoral process, dominated by the local party organizations, now became a more formal proceeding, still dominated by the major parties but with vastly more authority vested in the party elite." 60 Moreover, the social function of voting was being eclipsed by a view of voting as a private and independent activity. Herbert Croly, in 1909, echoing Mill from the century before, objected:
Independent voting and the splitting of tickets is essential to a wholesome expression of public opinion; but insofar as such independence has to be purchased by secrecy its ultimate value may be doubted…. It is curious that with all the current talk about the wholesome effects of "publicity" the reformed ballot sends a voter sneaking into a closet in order to perform his primary political duty…. In the long run that vote which is really useful and significant is the vote cast in the open with a full sense of conviction and responsibility.
61
The secret ballot brought with it new challenges. Is the ballot designed so that voters can easily choose their preferences? For instance, the "Massachusetts ballot," now the modern standard, organized candidates by office; the "Indiana ballot" listed columns of candidates by party. 62 The Massachusetts ballot was more conducive to independent voting and split tickets; the Indiana ballot encouraged straight ticket voting, but took less time to vote, reduced "roll off" and (by incorporating symbols for the parties) was easier for uneducated or illiterate voters to use. 63 However, California state courts found the Indiana form burdened voters who did not wish to vote the party ticket and was unconstitutional under the state's constitution. 64 Can voters verify their choice or correct a mistake? Pre-election voter education, such as distributing sample ballots in advance, reduced voter confusion but added to the expense of the election.
65 Is access to a place on the ballot impeded, so that voters trade an array of choices for confidentiality? 66 Are there voters who cannot read, or read the language of the ballot? Among some the motives for adopting the state-printed Australian ballot was exactly this -to disenfranchise illiterate voters. 68 An early point of contention was whether illiterate or blind voters could seek assistance in casting a "secret ballot." In Kentucky, the court concluded that the voters' right to vote included "the right to avail themselves of whatever reasonable aid and information may be necessary to enable them to cast their ballots understandingly . . ." 69 In neighboring Tennessee, however, the courts upheld a secret ballot law that prohibited voter assistance, concluding that "with little effort the unlettered voter can soon become as well acquainted with the printed name of his candidate and with his face…" 70 The Tennessee decision placed the secrecy of all ballots above the convenience of illiterate or handicapped voters.
Are there incentives at work that lead local election administrators to make the ballot confusing? Ballots can be organized a number of ways, and a jurisdiction that fluctuates among types can sow voter confusion even if its intentions are to "improve" the ballot. Richard Niemi and Paul Herrnson recently surveyed the many different forms of contemporary ballots, noting many that included confusing or seemingly contradictory instructions. 71 Whether a presidential ballot contains the name of the candidate for president, or the names of the "electors" to the Electoral College, can have tremendous consequences. Even when the instructions are clear, voters make mistakes. How will nonconforming ballots be counted, if at all? Can election administrators number ballots, so that in a recount or contest a voter can identify his ballot and can clarify his intent? State courts confronted with such systems split on whether such numbering was inconsistent with a guarantee of a secret ballot.
73
Do administrators try to skimp, by printing fewer ballots than needed? Do they try to make do with fewer polls by placing time restrictions on voting, or allowing long lines to form? As population increased, election administrators were faced with growing expenses in guaranteeing the secret ballot, in locating and staffing polling places, printing ballots and other materials, and tabulating returns. 74 Yet citizen outcry for greater election administration budgets was seldom heard.
Beyond the practical concerns, the old arguments persist -what does the secret ballot mean for deliberation and voter accountability? Does democracy lose something when a jurisdiction implements secret, state printed balloting? Voting in public is expressive, and a moment for citizens to talk, argue, reason, and inform and perhaps strengthen their opinions. 75 Some critics of the secret ballot regretted the passing of the public election, or of party ballots, as a time of great civic engagement and unparalleled interest in elections.
76 "Were people inclined to vote when there was no music and no flags -nobody to belt and nobody to cheer -and no hourly publication of the state of the poll?" Sturgis, an advocate of open voting, proposed a system that would require the voter to cast his vote privately, but how he voted would be published after the election. Id. at 18. He argues that this will thwart vote buying; however such would not be the case where, as has been the case historically, voter bribery is repeated from on election to the next. 83 Wigmore, supra note 21 at 82; BROOKS, supra note 54 at 427; J.J. McCook, Venal Voting: Methods and Remedies, THE FORUM (1892) at 163. Bought voters could also make a predetermined mark on a ballot, such as by using a distinctive paster or writing in a predetermined fictitious candidate, as a means of identifying their ballot and demonstrating they had voted as requested. Id.
voters to stay away from the polls. 84 These ills are present even when a particular voter voluntarily reveals his vote. Schemes through which bribed voters voluntarily mark their ballots so as to identify their votes burden those voters who refuse to partake in the scheme, and schemers may correctly infer that they have cast hostile votes. 85 In modern regimes, concerns about voter independence have dominated those who favor the deliberative spectacle of open voting. Today, conventional notions of democracy seem almost reflexively to include secret ballot elections. 86 Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights extends to every citizen the right to vote in elections that "shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors."
87 Article 14 of the European Constitution requires secret ballots in election to the European Parliament. 88 The European Human Rights Convention likewise called for periodic elections by secret ballot.
89 OSCE election inspection reports decry the slightest evidence that a vote might be cast in a nonconfidential context, even by inadvertence.
III. Nonconforming voting procedures
Whatever the relative merits of open or secret voting, one form of voting, to Bentham and Mill, was defective. Neither saw any justification for a "nonsecret ballot" -a situation where a ballot is marked, but away from the protection of the polling place, in situations where the voter is unprotected from coercion or influence.
In modern voting we depart from the vision both Bentham and Mill articulated. Today, we vote by ballot in conditions lacking compulsory secrecy, but public accountability and deliberation is also nonexistent. Both Bentham and Mill believed these kinds of situations were intolerable. Even if one assumes that a voter has voluntarily waived secrecy, these modes of voting do not serve to protect other voters, An ever increasing number of ballots are cast by mail, away from the compelled confidentiality of the polling place. Whereas 25 years ago only about 5% of the total votes cast were cast away from the traditional election-day polling place, in 2000 that percentage had risen to 14%, and in 2004 to approximately 22%. 91 In 2008, it appears that an unprecedented number -about 30% --of voters cast their ballots before Election Day, either at early polling locations or by voting absentee away from a polling place.
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The "demi-publicity" problem is not confined to public elections. In "card check" labor organizing campaigns, voters are asked to cast a vote in favor of union representation in frequently coercive situations. Moreover voting by corporate shareholders is not anonymous and susceptible of influence and coercion. Why is confidentiality not protected in these contexts? Should it be?
A.
Absentee Voting
History
States possess great discretion in election administration, so the history of the absentee ballot, like the secret ballot, is a history of state politics. Vermont first extended an "absentee" vote to civilians in 1896. 93 Its law, however, required that the absent voter cast a vote on election day at a polling place in the state. 94 and by 1928 all but three states had provided at some point for absent voting. 96 The vast majority of these laws allowed the voter to vote before election day, either by appearing in the registrar's office or before an officer qualified to administer an oath. 97 If the latter, once the voter has filled out his ballot in the officer's presence "in such manner that the secrecy of the ballot is preserved", sworn to his qualifications and reason for absence, the voter could return it to the election office by election day. 98 Commentators observed that so long as these laws ensured that ballots "would be voted under some public auspices and transmitted to the proper precincts protected from dishonesty and without violating the voters' confidence" that absent voting was little threat to the integrity of elections.
99
As voters needed to comply with a variety of prerequisites to vote absentee, few took advantage of absentee voting. In 1922, out of an electorate numbering 2,300,000 in New York City, 329 absentee votes were cast. 100 In 1928, notwithstanding that California had an absentee ballot law, a technicality forced President Herbert Hoover to travel to Palo Alto, California to cast his vote.
101 Joseph Harris, writing in 1934, estimated that the absentee vote constituted less than one half of one percent of the votes cast.
102
Absentee voting had its detractors, and the wave of adoption was followed by a second wave of retrenchment. In 1914, the California voters rejected an absent voter's act by 244,855 to 390,337. 103 The Los Angeles Times, for one, editorialized against the initiative as "a dangerous experiment" that "opens the door for fraud upon the electorate. More recently, legislators have broadened the availability of absentee voting in many states by adopting "no excuses" absentee balloting. That is, a voter can apply for and vote an absentee ballot even if able to reach the polls on election day.
108 Not surprisingly, absentee voting increased in these states -California's absentee turnout went from about 5% at the time its "no excuses" law was enacted, to over 30% in 2004. 109 California also adopted permanent absentee status in 2002, under which the state will send the voter an absentee ballot each election without the voter requesting a ballot each time. In 2005 21% of all registered California voters had permanent absentee status.
110
Innovations like "no excuses" absentee voting and permanent absentee status, by broadening the base of voters voting outside the protection of the polls, would logically increases the availability of absentee ballots for fraud. But even in jurisdictions where these innovations have not been adopted, a culture of absentee fraud can flourish. With 105 HARRIS, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 283. New Jersey's legislature repealed its absentee ballot law in 1926, in part because of the opportunity for fraud, but also because relatively few voters took advantage of it, and the state found it expensive to print numerous ballots to accommodate just a few voters. ROCCA, supra note 93 at 5, BROOKS, supra note 54 at 456. 112 One practice, known as "black satchelin'" involved candidate and party workers visiting voters, often with that voter's absentee ballot already in hand, to mark the ballot and pay the voter.
113 "The Black satchel brigade, consisting of the registrar, a notary public, an electoral board member, and a sack of applications and ballots, could effectively bring the entire election machinery to the homes of sympathetic voters. Even more egregious was the practice of voting dead or fictitious persons by absentee ballot."
114
From before World War II through the 1960s, absentee ballot fraud in southwest Virginia was common practice, and it was not uncommon for 25 percent of the vote in such counties to be cast absentee. 115 In 130 In the subsequent investigation, voters testified that they were led to vote inperson absentee by local candidates and instructed how to vote. 131 In tactics reminiscence of the black satchel practices of 20 years before, Dougherty approached voters, often at their homes with absentee ballot applications in hand, then later helped them vote their absentee ballots at the registrar's office. 132 Over a year after the election, Dougherty was indicted on 37 counts of absentee voter fraud, and eventually convicted of 29 of those counts. 133 In adjacent Wise County, Virginia, the 2004 election for Appalachia town council where roughly 20 percent of the votes cast were cast absentee, a criminal investigation led to 244 charges against mayor Ben Cooper for election fraud. 134 Cooper pled guilty to 233 counts, and was sentenced to 2 years in prison.
Absentee fraud using these techniques is by no means unique to southwest Virginia. 135 In accepting a no context plea because "it's been kind of difficult to put someone in the pokey for this since it has been going on for so long." 136 To the extent the public is interested in reforming absentee balloting, ironically that popular pressure in Virginia (and elsewhere) favors relaxing absentee ballot standards. The Virginia senate in 2009 passed "no-excuses" absentee voting. 137 To the extent absentee voting is seen as needing reform, most of the attention is on the error rates of absentee voting, and counsel that easier standards will result in fewer spoiled or rejected absentee votes. 138 Many of the frauds perpetuated in Southwest Virginia relied upon corrupt officials as much as foul play by candidates, activists, or others who were not election officials. Many involved voters willing to sell their vote. Better (or different) laws could do only so much when officials, candidates and voters are willing to enter a corrupt deal. But many other modern absentee voting scandals depend not on a corrupt insider, but porous rules and lax supervision. We turn to one major example of this now.
Absentee Voting and the Elderly/Disabled
Many frauds are also perpetuated in situations where the voter is an innocent victim. While some changes to existing absentee procedures could increase integrity somewhat, when balanced against the cost of these reforms, the more practical approach would be to offer early in-person voting in controlled environments rather than continuing to allow the private distribution and collection of ballots.
Elderly and disabled individuals who live in institutions or other long-term care facilities face a number of challenges in voting. They live day to day under the control of staff, such as a social worker or activities director, who are thus able to control whether they may vote at all. 140 Residents may be impaired, but yet only able to vote with the "assistance" of staffers or outside visitors, such as political workers.
141 Noted Dr. Jason Karlawish in testimony before the Senate, "Most residents need some assistance with absentee voting and typically a single staff member provided this assistance."
142 Or residents who desire to vote may be denied access to voting at the subjective call of institutional staff, perhaps because of staffing shortages or logistical problems. Karlawish, et al, Identifying the Barriers supra note 140at 70. Indiana has enacted a "Nurse Rachet Law" that forbids staff from interfering in a voting board's visit to a voter, so long as the time is agreed to by the voter and the board and is during regular business hours. Indiana Code 3-11-10-25(c); 3-14-3-4.
One fundamental logistical issue is whether the voter may vote in the precinct where the institution is located, or whether instead the resident is still technically a domiciliary of their previous home. It may be hard for a resident to admit that they are states with stricter rules on absentee voting -as in Pennsylvania, which does not allow for delivery of absentee ballots by third parties --exceptions have been crafted for disabled voters. 144 In these settings, some advocates for elderly voting urge jurisdictions to implement mobile voting. 145 Under these proposals, trained election workers would visit institutions once to register residents, and then at election time to have them vote.
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Wisconsin operates such a program, by which special voting deputies deliver absentee ballots to these institutions, accompanied by party observers if the parties choose to send them. 147 These special deputies distribute the absentee ballots and are the only individuals (other than a relative who may be present) permitted to assist these voters in voting. 148 In Multnomah County, Oregon, a special 32-member Voter Assistance Team provided off-site assistance to voters with disabilities or special needs both in care facilities in the 2006 election. 150 These costs would vary depending on the design of the program; for instance a Vermont pilot project offering mobile polling to residents of long-term care facilities took advantage of the generous help of volunteers, used paper ballots, and thus minimized costs. 151 Vermont's example may not be a useful model for other jurisdictions where the expected political biases of volunteers would create their own dangers.
These teams may be a better means for assisting and collection ballots from voters in residential care than partisan teams would be, but their integrity rests upon the honesty not returning to their former home, and in many jurisdictions it is that voter's intent that dictates domicile. See, e.g., Ind. Code 23-5-2-42.5; 3-5-5. 144 In Others advocate that these voters be allowed to claim "permanent absentee" status. Thus the elderly or disabled voter's registration would be permanent, and he or she would regularly receive automatically absentee voting materials. 153 The voter would be saved from apply for an absentee ballot for each election. 154 Yet one can imagine that access to such voters' mailings could prove a fruitful resource for intermediaries interesting in voting these ballots themselves. 155 Similar issues confront patients in veteran's hospitals. Although a smaller fraction of these voters may present cognitive challenges, they are still in large measure not physically capable of voting on their own and require the help of their institutional staff. The controversy surrounding voter registration activities in VA hospitals in 2008 overlooked this issue. 156 That oversight is unfortunate. It would make little sense to secure the ability to register veterans to vote if they could not subsequently obtain and vote a ballot.
Under revised VA standards, pre-approved nonpartisan volunteers and personnel may now assist hospital patients to register, apply for an absentee ballot, and mark that ballot. 157 will tell if this system is adequate. If it proves successful, and if the expense of mobile polling programs for elderly or disabled voters residing in institutions proves too expensive, it may make sense for registrars to explore an option similar to this one.
Error rates
Finally, apart from the potential for coercion, bribery and other forms of undue influence on the voter, even in the best circumstances voters make mistakes. A voter may fail to register a proper vote for an office, yielding an "undervote" or vote for too many candidates for the same office, yielding an "overvote." Given the variety of ballot designs and the potential that a jurisdictions design might confuse voters, one would prefer a voting system that permitted the voter to correct mistakes. Absentee balloting cannot offer a means to verify that a valid ballot has been cast, without exposing the voter's secret ballot.
158 Voting in a polling place, using equipment that will reaffirm a voter's vote before the voter casts it, or at least reject an overvote, gives a voter some opportunity to revise a mismarked ballot.
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On the other hand, voting absentee provides the voter time to think about the vote, deliberate, and become educated on down-ticket candidates and issues. To the extent absentee voters tend to be better educated and older than election day voters, they may also be more proficient at voting. 160 So, absentee voting might show a reduced "residual" rate, that is, the casting of an invalid vote or failing to vote on an item. 158 See Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, Convenience Voting, in PEW CENTER ON The evidence shows that the problem of the miscast or "residual" absentee ballot is real and substantial. Residual vote rates for absentee voters tend to be higher than for early voting or election day voting at the polls. 161 In some jurisdictions the differences are striking. In California, for instance, the residual rate in the 2004 election was 1.0% for polling place voting, and 1.3% for absentee voting (out of 4,108,088 absentee ballots counted); in Virginia 0.7% for polling place voting versus 1.1% for absentee voting (of 221,890 absentee ballots counted), and in North Carolina 2.2% versus 4.6% (of 122,984 absentee ballots counted). 162 While some residual undervotes, may be deliberate, the fact that residual voting is also strongly related to ballot design suggests that voter confusion is a significant factor.
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Voters may also make mistakes in following the procedures to case a valid absentee ballot. Improperly signed or sealed absentee ballot envelopes will be rejected. 164 To be sure, absentee ballots are also rejected for other reasons -when they are returned as undeliverable, are replaced with another ballot, or are cast by a voter who is ineligible or deceased. In 2006, an estimated 347,000 mailed absentee ballots were rejected for all such reasons, with about 25,690 of these rejected because of no signature, and 2,993 because the voter used the incorrect envelope. 165 The statistics for military absentee voting are worse; in the 2006 general election, 992,034 ballots were requested through the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act ("UOCAVA") our of roughly 6 million eligible voters. 166 Voters cast about 333,000 UOCAVA ballots, for a turnout of about one-third. 167 For the 48,628 rejected ballots for which jurisdictions recorded reasons, the most common reason was, not 161 Kimball, supra note 160 at 15; see also NONPROFIT VOTER ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, AMERICA GOES TO THE POLLS: A REPORT ON Kimball, supra note 160 at 19. Residual vote rates are lower when ballots feature the option of voting a straight party ticket, which reduces confusion, and when properly marked, prevents overvoting and undervoting, by automatically voting the party's candidate in each partisan race. Id. (Table 30b) . Id. at 10. Since jurisdictions do not comply the data consistently, it is not possible to extract how many UOCAVA ballots were rejected as a fraction of the ballots cast. See id. at 9-10. surprisingly given the mobility of our armed forces, that the ballot had been returned undeliverable. 168 Other reasons included untimely delivery to the election administrator, which is a substantial issue for UOCAVA voters and largely beyond the voter's control 169 , missing signatures, missing dates, and missing date on the witness's signature. Deficiencies that reflect voter mistakes, like failing to use the correct envelope or sign the outside, should be included with the residual vote data to gain a complete picture of the error rate in absentee voting.
While the percentages of rejected ballots are low overall, in close contests these votes become a flashpoint for contention. Rejected absentee ballots were a major point of dispute between Minnesota Senator Norm Coleman and his 2008 challenger, Al Franken. On Election Day Minnesota officials rejected 12,000 absentee ballots (out of 300,000 cast). 170 According to Coleman, these ballots were cast in substantial compliance with state requirements and in good faith; while Franken argued that deficiencies rendered them invalid.
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The important point is this: that although absentee voters as a group would appear better prepared to vote, given their demographics, absentee ballots have more mistakes on them. Something about voting away from the polls affects a voter's ability to cast a valid ballot. That "something" may be as simple as having a checking device at the polling place to reject overvotes and ballots with illegible marks. This would seem to be a persistent deficiency in absentee voting not readily capable of remedy.
Effect on turnout
Even with the issues of fraud, coercion, and error, absentee voting is convenient. Busy voters can set aside time to vote, and need not worry about work schedules, child care, long waits in line, and the other burdens of voting in a polling place. That being the case, one would expect that as absentee voting is made more available, turnout would improve. Those individuals who were kept away from the polls before would now be voting. Voting by mail or voting absentee seems to improve turnout among socioeconomic groups that are already most likely to vote and in the kinds of elections where turnout is typically low.
172 But "convenience alone will not do much to increase 168 Id. at Table 25a . the participation rates among groups who are either uninterested or alienated from the political process and therefore do not vote." 173 The infirm and disabled are an exception to this general rule. These voters rely heavily on absentee ballots, are comparatively less likely to vote in person, but more likely to vote absentee. 174 The modern loosening of absentee rules has made voting more realistic for these voters, although turnout among them remains low. 175 Additional convenience can also only do so much to interest people in politics who are ailing, or possibly facing grave personal crises. Id. at 1031 (citing sources).
B.
Card Check and "Employee Free Choice"
The National Labor Relations Act, like the weather, has been something about which seemingly everybody complains but no one can fix. 176 As union memberships shrink, one of the key points of contention has been how an employer (or the National Labor Relations Board) should measure worker support for a particular union. 177 Traditionally, lawmakers have drawn analogies between union organization as "workplace democracy" and political elections.
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A union can become the recognized agent for collective bargaining in one of three ways. It may be selected by a majority of the unit's employees in an NLRB-conducted election.
179 Or the employer may agree to recognize the union once a majority of its workers have signed authorization cards. 180 Finally, the NLRB may order a union be recognized if a majority of workers have signed authorization cards and the employer has engaged in practices that make a fair election unlikely.
181 Accordingly, in situations where there is a "question of representation" -typically because a union claims to be the designated representative of a set of employees and the employer disputes that claimthe Act requires the Board to direct an election by secret ballot. Labor organizations complain that this system is unduly burdensome, in that employers presented with authorization cards from a majority of the relevant unit's employees must see that the union has employee support and should be recognized as the collective bargaining unit for the employees. As the law stands now, however, even if the union presents authorization cards from a supermajority of employees, the employer may still insist upon an election. 183 During the period before the election, unions complain that employers can inundate their employees with anti-union information, intimidate employees, threaten retaliation, bribe employees, and otherwise coerce the employees' judgment, reducing if not eliminating the chances the election will favor the union.
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Voting at a Certification-Election Day resembles voting at public polls in many respects. Employees present themselves to monitors, who once satisfied with the voter's bona fides, provide a ballot, and direct the voter to a booth. 185 After the voter marked the ballot, a worker under the scrutiny of an NLRB agent deposits the ballot into a ballot box.
186 Election contests are heard by the NLRB. Notably, of the 102 representation election cases closed by the NLRB in February 2009, unions won 68.
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Authorization "card check" campaigns resemble absentee balloting in some respects. Individuals supporting the union solicit signatures from employees one-on-one, often at home and away from observation by others. 188 The encounters can be unpleasant. Solicitors have threatened workers, or misrepresented the effect of signing the card to obtain signatures. 189 or individuals may sign just to bring the transaction to a prompt and pleasant conclusion.
191 "In the context of a union organizing drive, peer pressure from fellow workers and from the union to sign union membership cards may make it difficult for an employee to express genuine feelings about the union."
192 As in political elections, bribing voters is not permitted, but conflicting NLRB interpretations have made the standard here murky. 193 Similarly, supervisors may call organizers aside, and counsel them against engaging in this protected activity, unlawfully threaten them with dire consequences, or promise advantages if the employee ceases their activities.
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At present, the closest analogy in politics to a card check effort is a petition drive, as in both sufficient signatures merely trigger an election by secret ballot on a question. 195 But under proposed revisions titled the "Employee Free Choice Act" (EFCA) a card check effort that obtained a bare (absolute) majority of the unit's workers signatures would bring all relevant workers, whether or not they like it, under the collective bargaining representation of the union with no separate election.
196 At present, the employer, although not capable logistically to argue against the union's efforts during the card check drive, has the opportunity to reach workers with its perspective during the campaign before the election. 197 Under the proposed revisions to federal labor law, this The union needs 30% of the unit's employees signatures to obtain an election, but as a matter of practice unions only proceed when they have in hand over 50%, because experience shows that employees defect from the union's cause once the campaign is under way. Brudney, supra note 177 at 832. Employers may also enter neutrality agreements with unions, consenting to recognize the union based on the card-check effort only. See opportunity disappears. Thus, if revised, a card check authorization effort would be analogous to a one-sided petition drive with the power, alone, to amend existing law.
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To be sure, this change in the law would prevent supervisors and employers agents from threatening, coercing or bribing employees not to support the union, but one wonders whether the appropriate remedy for these unfair labor practices is to cut the employer's perspective out of the campaign. 199 Thus, under EFCA, we encounter an even more extreme example of Bentham's "demi-publicity" than in the absentee balloting context. At least absentee balloting occurs within the requisite time limits and deadlines of a particular campaign. A union authorization card can be deemed "current" for a year of more after being signed, and cannot be revoked by the worker. 200 Here, a worker is approached by one party to the contest, and compelled to vote for union representation or face the unpleasant Moreover, the union has the ability to define the bargaining unit (even after the cards are gathered, in essence drawing their "district lines" after the vote), and may proceed to collect worker's signatures without notice, and not subject to any specific time limit. Epstein, supra note 195 at 29-30, 47. Notably, authorization cards may only be used to organize a workplace that is presently nonunion. They may not be used in an effort to deauthorize a union. Id. at 45. Nor may employers participate in the signature gathering process, or launch its own effort. Brudney, supra note 177 at 852. Once the union is certified as the bargaining representative, it is entitled to a nonrebuttable presumption of majority status within the workforce for a reasonable time, typically one year. 201 The organizer either walks away with a signed card, or he doesn't.
Furthermore, because card check efforts need not be publicized, nor the identities of supporters released, there is no way for a worker whose name had been fraudulent added to the union's list to detect the fraud -at least the voter whose absentee ballot is intercepted by a third party may notice it missing, or find out on election day that a vote has already been case in his name. 202 And, of course, unlike voting a secret ballot under the supervision of some neutral overseer, the worker is vulnerable to coercion and/or fraud. Furthermore, unlike a public meeting to vote for representation, he cannot hear competing arguments, ask questions, or observe the attitude of his colleagues. Finally, the card check process is only available in the situation where a workplace is being organized. It is not available if employees want to change their representative from one union to another one, or want to rescind recognition. 203 The EFCA card check elements are thus analogous to offering convenience voting for some offices or ballot questions, but not others.
If we reject the "demi-publicity" of card-check organizing, then which is bettersecret ballot or open meetings? Are there situations where one alternative is preferable? History teaches us that while union organizing and representation elections need not always be unpleasant, they have that potential. The purpose behind the NLRA, after all, was to increase industrial peace in an often hostile context. The rise of the neutrality agreement/card check model via private contract between unions and employers provides a useful alternative already for those situations where each side can work with the other. 204 Those that remain subject to the NLRA restrictions are the organizing 201 See Excelsior Underwear, 156 NLRB 1236 (1966) (employee cannot claim privacy right to keep union sentiments secret from the union). 202 See Brudney, supra note 177 at 861 (noting that authorization cards are presumed valid). campaigns that are tense, contested, and unpleasant. Therefore, it is unlikely that a "public meeting" alternative would work, for all the reasons noted above, in those workplace campaigns that now proceed under the NLRA.
Thus, we should follow the teaching of history, experience, and Jeremy Bentham, and preserve employee access to the secret ballot in the labor organizing context. We should probably do more to ensure that union elections in general are free from fraud, coercion and bribery, and enforce the law equally against management and labor. Secret ballot elections are no guarantee -experience has shown that they too can be used as a tool of fear and manipulation, as the unhappy histories of certain trade unions will attest. 205 Those matters reach beyond the task of this Article, which has been to explain the importance of the secret ballot in certain settings, especially those where voters have reason to fear retribution. Fewer contexts present a clearer example of this than the contested union organizing election.
To the extent unions are correct to complain about existing NLRB election practices, the correct solution is to reform the elections, not craft an end run around them. 206 To the extent unions are correct to complain about delays in holding elections, perhaps the law should impose timelines. To the extent the "political model" of union certification elections is flawed, as Matthew Bodie suggests, perhaps other means need to be crafted to provide workers a better factual picture of what organization will mean for them. 207 We should not make the mistake of looking at the contested election context as the only avenue available to labor organizers, when in fact this may be a shrinking share of the whole. Private contractual procedures for gauging employee support are available and increasingly common. The election route may become atypical, as the truly difficult certification efforts will be the ones that dominate there. It would be unwise in future policymaking to let this tail wag the dog.
C.
Shareholder voting practices of Incorporation. 210 If the corporation is listed in a stock exchange, the exchange may also require shareholder votes in additional contexts. 211 These votes are cast on "ballots," away from any protective polling location, and in fact the identity of the voter is on the ballot. The corporation can see who has voted and how they voted. Is this voting process legitimate, given the concerns raised throughout this article about non-public, non-confidential balloting?
Corporate voting, especially in large, publicly-traded companies, has characteristics not shared by the other forms of voting discussed above. One challenge peculiar to shareholder voting is the volatility of the corporation's "electorate." Unlike voters, who register and vote based mostly on domicile, or workers, who are part of a collective bargaining unit determined by their job, the shareholder franchise is based on possession, perhaps fleeting, often indirect, of an intangible asset. Some shareholders hold stable portfolios over time, but many do not. Simply because someone possesses shares as of a certain date may say little about their stake in the operation of the company, or their knowledge of its operations. 212 Moreover, investors may loan their securities to others, and with it, the votes associated with those shares. 213 Those borrowers may be acquiring the shares simply for their vote, and thus would be able to vote without having anything meaningful at stake. 214 "Empty voting" by investors who have hedged their positions has been controversial, and it is hard to think of an analogous situation in politics where large voting blocks would cast their votes "insincerely." 215 Unlike a voter or worker, the identity of the beneficial shareholder may not be known, if, as is frequently the case, the owner of record is not the individual investor, but a broker or other nominee. 216 If investors have elected to be treated as an objecting beneficial owner (OBO) the company will never know their individual identities, but can only convey voting materials to intermediaries. 217 For example, in a recent proxy battle, Target Corporation had to "campaign" via press release with its shareholders, instructing them in simple if clumsy terms to "vote the WHITE proxy card," and "not to return any 210 proxy card sent by Pershing Square." 218 Target can't "target" this message to the shareholders who would care, and ends up communicating with a larger public that is not involved. This makes for an inefficient "campaign" but also means that the corporation at this stage is unable to coerce or unduly influence the shareholder. Yet this situation is fleeting -once the vote is cast, management could see who voted how, and lobby shareholders or the transmitting intermediaries whose votes are against management's position. 219 Moreover, beneficial shareholders may not in fact control their votes. Under Delaware law and decisions, if a intermediary nominee votes shares against the wishes of the investor, or otherwise prevails on the investor to vote his proxy a certain way, that is a private matter between those parties, and not a matter of concern to state regulators. 220 If the investor never receives the materials, the custodian may vote the "uninstructed" shares as it sees fit. 221 Voters can also change their votes. Even after an investor casts a vote or instructs the custodian of the shares how to vote, he may reverse that vote -until the end of voting a shareholder may cast multiple votes, and only the proxy cast last in time determines the votes of the shares. 222 Shareholders can enter into "voting trusts" that bind them contractually to vote a certain way, and can "buy" votes. 223 Many shared traits in other voting contexts -an identifiable and relatively stable electorate to whom a campaign can be directed, who cast votes directly, on ballots where there is some means for imposing ballot integrity, are simply not present in corporate voting.
In the context of this study, corporate voting would seem to share some of the unappealing traits identified above with absentee and card check voting. A shareholder casts a vote outside a setting shielded from influence or coercion. In fact, similar to the card check setting, a shareholder can be approached again and again during a voting Id. at 1250. Corporate voting rules do not distinguish between nonvoting as a result of apathy, and "disenfranchised" nonvoting because the shareholder did not receive voting materials. Brokers may votes these shares on routine matters, custodian banks may not. Id. period to "re-vote." 224 Corporate voting would thus be classified as a form of "demipublicity" that our analysis suggests is illegitimate. Do the differences between shareholder voting and the other forms we looked at mean that the shareholder voting context is not susceptible to the same analysis? Not all shareholders are alike, and it is in their differences that important distinctions appear that may lead us to different conclusions under our model. 225 In a large-publicly traded corporation, small shareholders, unlike voters or workers, would likely find that "exit" from the corporation, perhaps fleeing to a competitor or financial substitute, is easier (and maybe even preferable) than researching and voicing an opinion through voting. 226 So whatever influence or pressure they may suffer when casting their vote can be avoided easily, if they so choose. The small investor vote nevertheless sits out there as a potential check against managerial excess, and a means for better managers to take control of the enterprise by purchasing the shares. 227 One scholar, accordingly, described shareholder voting as a means of error correction, rather than a source for general decisionmaking. 228 The concerns we have about oppression of voter's judgment in the union organizational or absentee balloting contexts aren't as strong here.
But not all corporations are large, publicly traded companies. How does open voting fare in closely held corporations, when shares may be relatively illiquid and exit is thus difficult? 229 Here, the other characteristics of mass voting are also not present. Voting in closely held corporations is more like voting on a committee, faculty or HOA, face to face, where votes are usually cast openly after motions and debate. We don't see the logistical impediments to open voting with debate that exist in mass elections. To the extent coercion or duress are present, the legal system has relegated those concerns to the private law arena. Moreover, contests for control in the nonprofit context, where shareholders are altogether lacking, are pursued either by attempting to place sympathetic 224 individuals on the Board of the group, or recruiting members who can then pressure the organization to change priorities. 230 To assert that there is no political gamesmanship or coercion in these contexts would be naïve, but given the number and diversity of such bodies, it is hard to imagine how mandated secret voting would be implemented. Moreover, open voting with debate, discussion and the potential for reconsideration, as observed at the outset, is the most flexible and accommodating form for taking votes. On balance, corporate voting does not present a situation where the secret ballot is helpful for ascertaining the will of participants.
Larger institutional shareholders of publicly traded corporations fall at the opposite end of the spectrum from the small shareholder. These investors are more analogous to representatives (of their beneficiaries, perhaps, or of other shareholders), and, like members of Congress or Parliament, in our model should appropriately cast a public vote. Where it makes little sense for the individual shareholder to have to register a public opinion on the board of directors or a merger, a large shareholder such as a union pension fund, TIAA-CREF or Calpers has the resources to bring questions before the shareholders and advocate for change. 231 Activist hedge funds make it their business to agitate for corporate change. 232 These shareholders should engage openly, sharing research, views, arguments, and responding to the corporation's defenses and counterproposals. 233 It is good for the corporation, other investors, as well as the economy if that engagement, and the votes cast in its wake, are public. 234 Moreover, larger investors may be the ones that engage in insincere "empty voting." If a vote on a corporate matter is to have legitimacy with all shareholders, these large shareholders may need to be monitored. 
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See Verret, supra note 225 at 1030-31 (noting increased feasibility of contested elections with less expensive proxy solicitation). 232 Id. at 1031-32. 233 Macey, supra note 210 at 203 (noting greater capacity for participation of large shareholders); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 213 at 487-88 (noting power of pension funds, criticisms of CalPERS for pursuing political agenda). Hayden & Bodie also acknowledge the controversy surrounding sovereign wealth funds, which invest foreign government assets into private American companies. Id. at 489-91. 234 In fact, the beneficiaries of share holdings, like pensioners or fund investors, might benefit as beneficiaries from knowing more about how their representatives vote, but that is an argument beyond the scope of this paper. Monks 236 He contends that the lack of confidentiality distorts the voting of institutional investors in favor of incumbents. These investors, banks, funds, and other players in the financial world, will have business interests better served by remaining on good terms with corporate insiders, then by voting for challengers who are better for overall shareholder value. 237 Yet this is a problem with conflicting interests, and one not unique to corporate voting. It isn't clear the problem disappears with a "secret ballot" cast in circumstances akin to an absentee ballot. 238 Just as with absentee voting, if the investor wants to show corporate incumbents how its shares voter, it can. The problem is when no one else can see. 239 Bebchuk acknowledges that the SEC had required (as of 2003) mutual funds to disclose how they voted, but believes this is inadequate because fund investors will base decisions on "investment performance" not whether the fund voted one way or another. 240 This would appear to acknowledge that in some, if not many cases, a self-interested vote for the incumbent is also a vote for economic performance. At that point, if our worry is about shareholders voting for bad management, the conflict problem may vanish.
Substantial differences between "corporate democracy" on the one hand, and workplace or public democracy on the other hand, mean that the model developed at the outset applies differently. The exchange between these representative institutional shareholders and the corporation is more analogous to a legislative debate, or oversight of administrators, than an election requiring the protection of the secret ballot.
IV. Conclusion
The debate over the ballot in England, as well as the imposition of the secret ballot in the United States, left us with a powerful means to evaluate forms of voting.
There are situations where votes should be cast openly following discussion and deliberation. In other situations, voting a secret ballot under the auspices of the state or some neutral party is a better method. But a hybrid of these -where votes are cast away 236 Confidential voting was a prominent issue for activist shareholders (especially the United Shareholders Association) in the early 1990s, but waned after 1994. See Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter? 32 J. LEGAL. STUD. 465, 476-77. 237 Bebchuk, supra note 219 at 704-05. Other empirical studies indicate that adopting confidential voting does not affect corporate voting outcomes. Romano, supra note 237 at 506.
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Bebchuk does not suggest that shareholders vote in polling places, and it is difficult to imagine how a large publicly traded corporation could implement such a system.
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Once we see these large investors as akin to representatives instead of individual voters, then the "secret voting" system resembles the secret parliamentary voting Jeremy Benthem argued so vigorously against. See supra notes 26-30. 240 Bebchuk, supra note 219 at 706. from the view of others, and without the protection of a neutral, incorporate the weaknesses of each alternative without their strengths.
We should be reluctant to implement voting on these terms, and should seek to restructure the existing occasions of non-public non-secret voting to either protect the secrecy of the vote or open up antecedent deliberation and accountability. Absentee voting is popular, but experience demonstrates that the benefits that cone with convenience must be balanced against the potential for fraud, coercion, and error. We should take similar lessons from the labor organization experience, and not subject workers to nonsecret nonpublic card check "votes." Corporate voting is sufficiently different that the secret ballot's own weaknesses weigh more heavily in the balance, and in the end nonsecret proxy voting may be the best means for beneficiaries and the public to keep large institutional investors in check.
